Legacies of a Strong Welfare State: Attitudes toward the Role of Government in Economic Redistribution among Polish Youth

Research Thesis

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By

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Abstract

At the ideological heart of the Communist era in Eastern Europe was the view that government should be a centralizer and redistributor of economic resources among all. This ideology was indoctrinated into the youth during the Communist era, and prior research shows that youth internalized it and exhibited preferences for a strong governmental role in economic redistribution. With such indoctrination, we would expect that the legacy of the Communist era would exert a strong effect on individuals' attitudes towards the state, but for how long and how strong is not well known. Using the Polish Panel Survey POLPAN from 1988 to 2013, I compare youth opinions on State Paternalism in each five-year wave, and explore how the legacy of communist ideas shapes attitudes towards the welfare state. The results showed that overall youth in the immediate period after the fall of communism in Poland held a more positive evaluation of State Welfare support than youth further removed from such a time when compared to their elder counterparts. Furthermore, age did affect evaluation of State Welfare support policies—but only in certain waves and with certain age groups. The statistical analysis show that Polish youths' attitudes towards socialist policies and capitalism vary by cohort. Over time, youth in Poland have progressively grown more distant from State Welfare support ideals. I discuss how the communist legacy does not appear to withstand the test of time for youth evaluation of such policies has grown increasingly negative as compared to their elder counterparts as the communist era fades into memory.

Introduction

At the ideological heart of the Communist era in Eastern Europe was the view that government should be a centralizer and redistributor of economic resources among all. In a strong welfare state, the government attempts to reduce inequality by providing jobs, reducing income inequality, and seeking to ensure all have access to education. The benefits of such policies were widely touted during the Communist era, and prior research shows that youth socialized during the communist era internalized these values and exhibited preferences for a strong governmental role in economic redistribution. Consequently, we might expect that many years after Communism fell, the post-communist neoliberal indoctrination would produce youth who prefer a weaker role of the government in economic redistribution (Glass and Marquart-Pyatt 2007). While previous research shows that the legacy of the Communist era exerts a strong effect on citizens attitudes (Kunovich 2000), for how long and how strong is not well known.

I address this puzzle by empirically examining the opinions on State Paternalism from youth in both the Communist era, as well as the eras following Eastern Europe's transition to a market based economy and liberal democracy. Specifically, I use the Polish Panel Survey POLPAN from 1988 to 2013 to compare youth opinions on State Paternalism in each five-year wave, and explore how the legacy of communist ideas either persists or dwindles depending on the system youth were socialized under. Using the dependent variable of the frequency of positive answers related to state support, directly related to the independent variables of the years when these questions were asked, and specificity of the questions I can determine if the time period polish youth were socialized under truly impacts their opinions on State Paternalism and the welfare system.

This project contributes to prior research through an exploration of the complexity of political ideals, and how they are affected by time. First, by looking at their answers after both the fall of communism in Poland and much later on, my analysis contributes insights into how people react to free market systems, and how the period they were socialized in may affect their beliefs towards state responsibilities. I compare the answers and see the legacy of the communist period in Poland, whether it persisted in their belief of state supported systems, and whether the free market system has brought about a new wave of political ideals for Polish youth. More broadly, this research offers unique insights into geopolitical factors influencing youth beliefs about state assistance. As the youth in 1988, 1993 and 1998 would have lived under the communist regime, they are familiar with the extensive social resources such a system provides, whereas the youth of 2003, 2008 and 2013 are removed from it, and therefore can give insight into how communist ideas—specifically regarding State Paternalism—withstand time. Overall, studying youth opinions on the Communist welfare system both before and after the collapse of communism will shed light onto the legacy political systems leave when they collapse as well as how ideals may vary per generation.

Legacy related Support for State Paternalism Policies: Theory and Hypotheses

As reflected in the growing support for Democratic socialism in the United States, recent trends in political attitudes has motivated a growing collection of research that aims to understand how geopolitical legacies influence attitudes towards social welfare has gained. In their analysis of perceptions of income inequality in post-communist Europe, Binell and Loveless (2016) argue that income is inversely correlated with perceptions of both income and social inequality, and therefore one can expect that people with higher incomes are less likely to support polices of State Paternalism. Focusing on Poland specifically, Kunovich (2000) examines approval of the welfare

state politics during final stages of the socialist system and the initial phase of transition to capitalism, 1988 to 1993. She also looks at who supported welfare state policies in both periods, and whether personal advancement or decline in the social-stratification system had an effect on support for welfare state policies. She argues the following points: there should be an overall decline in support of welfare policies that would occur between 1988 and 1993; persons in vulnerable economic positions in 1993 and facing a future of economic vulnerability would be most supportive; and lastly individuals who were able to improve their relative positions quickly would be most opposed to such policies. She examined opinions related to broadening access to education, reducing economic inequality, and limiting unemployment in Poland. Kunovich found that older people are supportive of such policies, and that increase in income leads to a decrease in overall levels of support.

Glass and Marquart-Pyatt (2007) analyzed changes in overall support for redistributive policies in Poland over time from transition of state socialism, and analyze changes in social predictors of support for redistribution. They look at how welfare policy changes affect attitudes toward redistribution and value commitments toward the role of the state, as well as how institutional changes in welfare affect attitudinal patterns among populations in transitional societies. The authors argue that there will be a strong and widespread support for redistribution specifically among women, the unemployed, pensioners, those with a university education and members of the working class. Their data includes survey questions and answers from POLPAN data in years 1988-2003. Overall, Glass and Marquart-Pyatt found that citizens remain supportive for the most part, especially for those who perceive a worsening of their material situation express support for redistributive policies across all 4-time points. However, contrary to their hypotheses, strong support in Poland comes from the working class, rather than those educated. The authors conclude

that Poland is unique when compared to other eastern European nations, as its support for redistributive policies has remained somewhat strong due to the lasting legacy of state socialism. The sample does not control for age however, whereas factoring age into the regression can help one understand just how strong the state socialism legacy truly is among the newest generation to come of age in Polish society.

One can argue that economic motivations are primary drivers of attitudes toward political redistribution of economic resources—meaning that in order to truly understand what influences opinions on socialist policies they must examine income and perceptions of inequality in that realm. Corneo and Gruner (2002), in their cross-national study of support of governmental reduction of income inequality, argued that individual preferences toward income redistribution are a mix of factors. They found that individuals who would financially benefit from a reduction of inequality are more likely to support it. There is a negative effect on individual relative income and the probability they will support such reform. Lastly, the authors found that individuals living in former socialist countries are more likely to support a government role in reducing inequality. Furthermore, Ksenia Northmore-Ball (2016) argues opinions on inequality is likewise shaped by process related to transition from communism in these countries; and by looking at opinions of youth, one can see how this transition has affected their perception of the system, and how increased observations of inequality may lead to varying levels of support for former socialist policies.

Taken together, this literature suggests youth opinions on State Paternalism will depend on not only their income, education and gender, but the system under which they were socialized as well. As the Communist era recedes further and further into the past, the youth are less likely to support State Paternalism due to their lack of experience with such polices. Rather modern Polish

youth are likely to support the democratic capitalist system, leading to a more negative evaluation on their behalf of state paternalism policies of the communist era. Building on this collection of scholarship, the purpose of this research is to assess the differences between youth opinions over time and examine whether the trends described above persist in a specific age group when compared to the rest of the population. Specifically, I test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Youth in 1988 through 1998 will have a more favorable attitude toward State Paternalism than youth in the 2000s due to their socialization under the communist system.

Hypothesis 2: A respondent's age has a statistically significant impact on their evaluation of State Paternalism policies.

Hypothesis 3: Respondents with higher education will evaluate State Paternalism policies more negatively than those with less education.

Hypothesis 4: Respondents with higher income will evaluate State Paternalism policies more negatively than those with lower income.

Data and Variables, and Methods of Analysis

The Polish Panel Survey POLPAN monitors changes in structure, class and stratification in Poland. It has been carried out every five years since 1988, and surveys a random sample of about 2500 individuals a year with emphasis on surveying those who have participated before. The survey includes items on socio-demographics and opinions on income distribution, among others. POLPAN is unique because it adds younger people in each wave, and therefore can track changes in social structure over time. For my project, I use the POLPAN data sets from all finished waves (1988-2013).

My dependent variables are constructed from the following survey questions: "The state should assist children from poor families by facilitating their access to higher education", "The

state is responsible for reducing differences in incomes", and "The state should provide jobs for everyone who wants to work". These were measured on a 7 point scale, with 1 indicating "Definitely agree" 2 "Rather agree" 3 "Neutral" 4 "Rather Disagree" 5 "Definitely Disagree" 98/8 "Do not Know" and 99/9 "No answer". These questions were asked in every wave, allowing me to assess changes over time. For my usage, I recoded the date to have 5 represent "Definitely disagree" and 1 represent "Definitely disagree", this was necessary to recode the "Do not know" and "no answer" variables into one category versus the two it had been broken into. I then created a factor variable based on correlation between each of my three recoded state paternalism variables based upon the original questions mentioned above. I labeled this factor variable "statewelfare[year]". This then allowed me to run regressions with one variable to assess the effect of age, income, education and sex on a respondent's perception of state paternalism in any given wave. With these questions, I can examine how youth who were socialized under communism perceived the responsibility of the state, and how the youth socialized under capitalism who are twenty years removed from such a state perceive it in the more modern times.

For the purposes of testing the above hypotheses, the key independent variable is respondent's age. I also control for a variety of other factors that previous research suggests will influence attitudes toward redistribution: income, education (measured in years), and gender. I also control for previous waves when necessary as to see if age is the most influential on youth opinions of socialism as predicted, and to determine how ideals about State Paternalism persist over time under differing systems. I can examine whether youth grow more favorable toward or against state paternalism compared to their elder counterparts as time progresses as well as examine any possible trends in Polish opinions on socialism previously unexplored.

[Insert Table 1 Here]

Method(s) of Analysis:

To test my hypotheses, I used linear regressions of State Welfare support on Age, Years of Education, Income and Gender. In the 1993, 2003, 2008 and 2013 waves, I controlled for youth opinions of the previous waves as respondents aged 21-25 in these waves would have been included in the next waves as respondents aged 26-30. I did not run an interaction regression for 1998, as no respondents were aged 21-25 in 1993 and therefore would have been removed from my group of interest in the 1998 wave.

[Insert Table 2 Here]

Results

The results support Hypothesis 1, showing that youth in waves 1998 through 1998 do have a more positive evaluation of socialism than youth in waves 2003 through 2013. Though the youth variable was not significant in 1988, both values were positive (0.049 and 0.041), as were both for the youth in 1998 (0.136 and 0.010). Youth in 1993 (-0.183) had a more negative evaluation of socialism then their counterpart however, matching with that of youth from 2003 (-0.158 and -0.007) and 2013 (-0.135 and -0.061). The 2008 wave presented a mixed response (-0.081 and 0.096), with youth both negatively and positively evaluating State Welfare support policies. However, overall youth in the immediate period after the fall of communism in Poland held a more positive evaluation than their counterpart of State Welfare support than youth further removed from such a time.

In partial support of Hypothesis 2, age did effect evaluation of State Welfare support policies—but only in certain waves and with certain age groups. In the 1988, 1993 and 2008 waves, age did not have an effect. However, when an interaction variable was added to the 1993 regression for age in 1988, age became a statistically significant ($p<0.1$) negative factor, meaning that youth

aged 26-30 in 1993 would have evaluated State Welfare support policies more negatively by 0.241ths of a point than those aged older than thirty when controlling for all other factors. The control factor for 2008 youth produced no such result in the 2013 regression, and therefore 2008 youth remained statistically insignificant in evaluating what influences opinions on State Welfare support policies. The Youth variable in the 1998, 2003 and 2013 waves however had a statistically significant impact on a respondent's evaluation of State Welfare support policies compared to those over 30 even without interaction controls. In the 1998 wave, the age group 26-30 had no statistically significant impact, however the group aged 21-25 had a statistically significant positive effect ($p<0.1$) meaning that respondents aged 21-25 in the 1998 wave evaluated socialism more positively by 0.136ths of a point than those over thirty when controlling for all other factors. The youth aged 21-25 had no statistically significant impact in the 2003 wave, whereas the youth aged 26-30 had a statistically significant impact ($p<0.1$), so respondents aged 26-30 evaluated socialism more negatively by 0.16ths of a point than those over thirty when controlling for all else in the 2003 wave. In 2013, the youth aged 21-25 had a statistically significant impact meaning that respondents would have evaluated State Paternalism policies more negatively by 0.135ths of a point than those over thirty when controlling for all else.

Lastly, I find support for Hypothesis 3 & 4, with results showing that a respondents' education and their income both had negative effects on their perception of State Welfare support in all waves. Moreover, a respondents' education (measured in years) has the strongest negative impact of these two hypothesis and most other variables in the regressions. While income and education were equally significant ($p<0.01$) in the 1988, 2003, and 2008 waves; in the 1993, 1998, and 2013 waves, education had a more negative statistically significant impact on a respondents' evaluation of State Welfare policies, meaning that for each additional year in education a

respondent gained, a respondent would evaluate state welfare support policies more negatively. Lastly, it is worth nothing that Sex was statistically significant in each wave, however further research would be needed to explore the link between sex and support of state paternalism policies.

Discussion

My results show that Polish youth hold an increasingly negative of state paternalism policies, when compared to their elder counterparts, but do not illustrate clear linkages between age and persistence of political system legacy. Moreover, my findings show an increasingly negative reaction over time, meaning that Polish youth began to perceive State Paternalism policies more negatively then those over thirty as time drew on, however there was not apparent explanation for this negative view.

To better understand why we see mixed support and significance only in comparison to previous opinions (i.e. as people grew older) is worth exploring what might be leading to the weak social welfare legacy among Polish youth and how that may translate into the overarching Communist legacy in the region. The most salient explanation for these results appears to be transitional difficulties seen as Poland transitioned to a market economy. To determine the effect of political legacies was the goal of my study, and these results appear to suggest that the legacy the Communist system left is a bitter one—especially with young people. The transition was by no means an easy one, and one “might also expect to see different values or behavior from a "post-transition" generation” (Pop-Eleches 2011). With such an expectation, the difference in opinions on state paternalism can be viewed as an indication that such a generation has arrived, for “as the memory of life under communism fades into the past, an individual's impression of the transition is likely to vary much more unevenly over time” (Pop-Eleches 2011) as did some opinions on State Welfare support throughout my statistical analysis. By far the most cohesive reasoning for my increasingly negative results appears to be these transitional problems, and the

problems experienced explain why Polish youth may hold a negative evaluation versus their elder counterparts. In order to understand why youth opinions may be so negative as a result of the transition from Communism to capitalism, it is important to account for the difficulty in the transition as well as the winners and losers of the transition process.

The transitional period from a command economy to a market economy in Poland gave way to many problems, and the country quickly faced unprecedented rates of inflation and unemployment. In the first year alone, prices grew "by 39.5% in August, 34.4% in September, and 54.8% October [of 1989]" (Oyrzanowski 1993) and later, prices grew by"78.6% in January and 23.9% in February of 1990. (Oyrzanowski 1993). Poles who had seen steady prices over the years were suddenly experiencing how demand affects price, and the demand for resources drove the prices to nearly unaffordable levels. This rise in prices was coupled with a drop in income "between 3% and 7% in the first half" (Oyrzanowski 1993) as well as a rise in unemployment. From June to December of 1990, unemployment rose from 3.2% to 6.3% (Oyrzanowski 1993), nearly doubling in six months. This rise continued with unemployment reaching a peak of 13.2% of the population in July of 1992. (Oyrzanowski 1993). These statistics indicate a rough transition from the get go, as Poland experienced "recession, hyperinflation, economic destabilization, spiraling unemployment and growing poverty" (Horvat 2011) early on. In other words, Poland suffered an economic shock, and by the early '90s, "unemployment benefits amount to 36% of the average wage minus income tax" (Oyrzanowski 1993/51). Over a quarter of the average wage was being provided by the state, and in turn "Forty-three percent of wage earners slid below the poverty line in the first half of 1992" (Hunter 2006). Polish society as it had existed before was essentially in shambles, as the young democracy struggled to balance rising inflation, low wages, and an ever-growing income gap. Despite these reforms hurting

certain groups more, Poland suffered as a whole during the transition, with a GDP only matching up to 39% of Western Europe in 1995 (Berend 2015). Poland's transition to a market economy was messy, and citizens experienced not only a social shock as systems began to be gutted, but also a harsh economic shock as well with "as much as 20-30 percent of the population falling into poverty (Berend 2015)". The Polish economic system—and population—suffered during the transition, and for people who were either just coming of age or aging out of the workforce, they would be forced into two categories in turn affecting their perception of the communist system for years to come.

These two categories would come to be known as the "winners" and the "losers" of the Polish economic transition. The people coming of age during the transition were in a unique position, as "young people in the 1990s had to negotiate a new environment, as unfamiliar to the traditional guides of parents and teachers as to the youths themselves" (Burrell 2011). The system their parents had grown up in was gone, and the new and emerging system presented many difficulties already. The focus on youth experience is especially pertinent, as younger generations as categorized as winners in the aforementioned model. This winners and losers model examines how "those who became winners in the process of transformation were, at its start in the late 1980s, in the forefront of those who liked socialism. However, when their success strengthened in the new system, they forgot about the advantages stemming from the old regime" (Slomczynski 2002). Winners were "managers, experts, owners, and supervisors" Słomczyński 2002), they were ""well-educated people, represented younger generations, came from bigger cities and legitimized rather short working experience in state-owned companies" (Szczepański 2010) lastly, "those individuals who actively took part in attempts aiming at introducing changes

in Poland" (Szczepański 2010). These people would be unlikely to favor the communist system because the market system had improved their standard of living.

In a study done by Słomczyński et al., participants were asked "Do you think that the socialist system brought to the majority of people in Poland: (1) gains only, (2) more gains than losses, (3) as many gains as losses, (4) more losses than gains, or (5) losses only?" (Słomczyński 2002). Those in the category of winner—especially experts and managers—showed a "regular and significant decrease in positive assessments of socialism. In 1988, they were at the top of the support hierarchy for socialism, while, in 1998, they landed at the very bottom" (Słomczyński 2002). These winners would have seen the system start to favor them, and therefore a negative assessment of the precious way only made sense. This negative feeling has persisted and "by 2007 Eastern Europeans agreed on average that their situation has improved… but the key finding is that the young have come to view their future economic prospects and the experience of the market place much more positively than early in the transition, while this was not apparent among older respondents" (Horvat 2011). Younger generations are growing increasingly negative towards the communist system, and my research highlights these results with my increasingly negative youth opinions. This notion of young people being "winners" would explain the occurrence of positive opinions in the relatively earlier transitional years, as well as why opinions began to shift even for those older young adults as the transition entered the late 90s and early 2000s.

There were also "those who became losers in the transformation [and later] realized the advantages of socialism" (Słomczyński 2002)—or those who would hold a more positive evaluation of state paternalism policies. The "losers" mainly consisted in "citizens with poorer education, representing older generations, coming from smaller towns and villages and with long

working experience in state-owned companies. Individuals supporting this attitude were characterized by the fear of change and withdrawal attitude" (Szczepański 2010). This negative perception if the market system stemmed from the difficult transition, particularly "the increasing cost of living and low wages" (Szczepański 2010) as well as the effect of "state subsidies [that were] cut and price controls [that were] lifted" (Horvat 2011). At the same time, "unregulated markets started to emerge… and Older age groups were often negatively and disproportionately affected" (Horvat 2011). With rising income inequality and prices, older generations who relied mainly on pensions found themselves at or below the poverty line very early in the transition. As a result, these people suffered the most during the transition, as "the fixed incomes of pensioners would make managing in the face of economic reform progressively more difficult as social welfare provisions continue to be cut" (Horvat 2011). They system they had grown used to with the ability to protect them from economic crisis was swept under from under them, and older generations faced inflation with uncertainty and longing for assistance. Furthermore, while young Poles now had unlimited opportunity, "older Eastern Europeans [experience] would have been made worse through a likely devaluation of certain resources and statuses attained under communism" (Horvat 2011). Whereas a market system presented limitless opportunity in terms of income and profession for young people just coming of age, those who had worked their whole life one way or another were not guaranteed a stable future in the same profession. Their ability to sustain had been threatened in a way it had not been under communism, and their opinions reflect their uncertainty of the new market system. This would be the group that held a more positive evaluation of socialism in each wave, as "individuals constituting [the] category of losers were not prepared participation in an emerging market economy (Szczepański 2010). Rather they had been thrust into a new system that appeared pitted

against them, making it harder for them to see opportunity among the potential financial ruin many faced.

While young people would have had the chance to make their own way in the new market system, older people were more likely to be on a fixed income and share "a common belief in safety rooted in a state owner, and fear of unpredictable future with private companies and modernity which they offer" (Oyrzanowski 1993). Thus the two generations became increasingly polarized, as the transition was worse for elder generations for younger, and youth expectations and experiences of positivity with the new market would only lead to further dissatisfaction for "older people would have borne the costs of economic reform disproportionately" (Horvat 2011). Therefore the challenging transition created a generational gap, one where older people "whose standard of living deteriorated in the course of transition tend to hold relatively more skeptical views of democracy and the market (Horvat 2011). Whereas the Communist system was less free, the current system held inflation and fear of unemployment, leaving older generations skeptical of its true possibility and favorable towards the old ways. Under this framework, it is clear the younger generations of Poles would hold a more positive evaluation of the Capitalist market system and a more negative perception of a system that caps their earnings, directly juxtaposed to the older generation who saw tremendous difficulty in the early market system years. Through the lens of transitional difficulty, it appears my results of increasingly negative opinions on State Paternalism among Polish youth may be a result of the "winners" and "losers" dynamic of the systemic shift.

This links directly to my own research, specifically as my youth opinions grew more negative over time. My youth opinions initially started as positive, but as soon as 1993 grew increasingly negative (aside from 1998) due to their status as "winners" in the transition.

Furthermore, since I separated youth to compare to their older counterparts, it is clear their opinion is more negative than that of said elder counterparts. The elder generation therefore appears to fit the "loser" category, as one can see the youth opinions on State Paternalism are more negative. This market transition took years, and would explore why anomalies such as 1998, for the economy had just begun to recover from the intitial transition phase but was not quite a full market system yet. To elaborate, when controlling for the 1998 interaction term, one can see that the 2003 wave grew increasingly negative, meaning that as the transition neared completion youth began to turn against state paternalism policies. Negativity quickly reappeared in 2003 and onward, when youth (especially those 21-25) would have been coming of age in full market economy with seemingly limitless opportunity. For those positive evaluations from the 26-30 group in 2008, one can factor in how these groups would have come of age during the tough transition and were then living through another economic crisis, and therefore may hold a positive evaluation as they would have seen the inflation or possibly faced unemployment. Though age was not significant in every wave, it quickly became so when controlling for previous opinion, showing that as youth began to experience the market economy, their perception of state paternalism policies grew more negative over time—even a 5-year period. It appears age and opinion on state paternalism policies are linked, and the influence age has is connected to the experience youth had growing up in a transitional economy as the "winners" in the system. As time wore on, youth would evaluate state welfare support more negatively than their elder counterparts due to their status ion the new market economy post-transitional difficulty.

Conclusion

Youth in Poland have progressively grown more distant from State Welfare support ideals then their older counterparts and the communist legacy does not appear to have withstood the test of time. Youth evaluations of such policies have grown increasingly negative when compared to those over thirty in each wave as the communist era fades into memory. Though fading is bound to happen in any system as previous ideals die with older regenerations, it is apparent in this specific case, increasingly negative perception can be viewed as a consequence of the difficult transition, and the idea that youth found themselves as winners when during economic hardship. Based on the data collected and a comparisons of previous studies and accounts, my findings that there are increasingly negative youth views of state paternalism in comparison to their elder counterpart illustrate not only a changing of youth opinions over time, but also a widening generation gap between those who suffered in the transition from a command economy and those who did not. The legacy of the communist system in Poland has become polarized, and my study examines how age may factor into a negative or positive perception of state paternalism policies. One important direction for future research is to compare the youth of former communist nations and the youth of non-communist nations, to test how ideals verses implementation factor into opinions on political systems. It is also important also further examine the effects of education and income to assess how these factors influence youth evaluation of state paternalism over time.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Age					
1988 (Ages 21-25)	0.070		0.000	1.000	5618.000
1988 (Ages 26-30)	0.120	0.330	0.000	1.000	5618.000
1993 (Ages 26-30)	0.080	0.270	0.000	1.000	2259.000
1998 (Ages 21-25)	0.100	0.290	0.000	1.000	2135.000
1998 (Ages 26-30)	0.080	0.270	0.000	1.000	2135.000
2003 (Ages 21-25)	0.130	0.340	0.000	1.000	1699.000
2003 (Ages 26-30)	0.070	0.260	0.000	1.000	1699.000
2008 (Ages 21-25)	0.320	0.470	0.000	1.000	1805.000
2008 (Ages 26-30)	0.070	0.260	0.000	1.000	1805.000
2013 (Ages 21-25)	0.190	0.390	0.000	1.000	2581.000
2013 (Ages 26-30)	0.130	0.340	0.000	1.000	2581.000
Education					
1988 (In years)	10.270	2.860	5.000	17.000	5618.000
1993 (In years)	10.740	3.100	5.000	17.000	2259.000
1998 (In years)	10.920	3.020	5.000	17.000	2063.000
2003 (In years)	11.510	3.060	5.000	21.000	1696.000
2008 (In years)	11.920	3.490	4.000	20.000	1805.000
2013 (In years)	12.490	3.070	6.000	20.000	2184.000
Income					
1988	145.030	91.060	14.290	2666.670	5333.000
1993	1688.290	3332.860	0.000	125000.000	2055.000
1998	605.650	823.240	0.000	20000.000	1867.000
2003	785.780	706.030	0.000	13000.000	1644.000
2008	1135.430	908.130	100.000	12100.000	1460.000
2013	1548.200	1703.530	0.000	50000.000	2021.000
State Welfare Factor					
1988	0.000	1.000	-4.440	1.090	1901.000
1993	0.000	1.000	-3.980	1.150	1158.000
1998	0.000	1.000	-4.420	1.240	2135.000
2003	0.000	1.000	-4.160	1.080	1699.000
2008	0.000	1.000	-4.940	1.210	1805.000
2013	-4.970	1.000	-4.970	1.140	2581.000
Sex	0.470	0.500	0.000	1.000	7304.000

Notes: See Appendix for Factor Loading. There were no respondents aged 21-25 in the 1993 wave

Table 2: Multi-Variate Regressions

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9
Ages 21-25 (1988)	0.049								
	(0.084)								
Ages 26-30 (1988)	0.041								
	(0.069)								
Income per Capita (88)	-0.001***								
	(0.000)								
Education in years (88)	-0.050***								
	(0.010)								
Sex (1=Male)	-0.117**	-0.171***	-0.132***	-0.189***	-0.201***	-0.245***	-0.128*	-0.119***	-0.156***
	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.062)
Ages 26-30 (1993)		-0.183					-0.241*		
		(0.109)					(0.135)		
Income per Capita (93)		-0.000					-0.000		
		(0.000)					(0.000)		
Education in years(93)		-0.119***					-0.107***		
		(0.011)					(0.012)		
Ages 21-25 (1998)			0.136*						
			(0.076)						
Ages 26-30 (1998)			0.010						
			(0.076)						
Income per Capita(98)			-0.000**						
			(0.000)						
Education in years(98)			-0.090***						
			(0.009)						
Ages 21-25 (2003)				-0.007				0.000	
				(0.071)				(0.000)	
Ages 26-30 (2003)				-0.158*				-0.196**	
				(0.088)				(0.089)	
Income per Capita(03)				-0.000***				-0.000***	
				(0.000)				(0.000)	
Education in years(03)				-0.069***				-0.049***	
				(0.009)				(0.009)	
Ages 21-25 (2008)					-0.081				
					(0.058)				
Ages 26-30 (2008)					0.096				
					(0.098)				

Table 2 (cont.)	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9
Income per Capita(08)					-0.000***				
					(0.000)				
Education in years(08)					-0.056***				
					(0.008)				
Ages 21-25 (2013)						-0.135**			
						(0.065)			
Ages 26-30 (2013)						-0.061			-0.113
						(0.072)			(0.069)
Income per Capita (13)						-0.000***			-0.000***
						(0.000)			(0.000)
Education in years(13)						-0.087***			-0.050***
						(0.009)			(0.010)
Interaction (1988)							-0.250*		
							(0.134)		
State welfare support(88)							0.274***		
							(0.037)		
Interaction (1998)								-0.001	
								(0.111)	
State welfare support (98)								0.268***	
								(0.031)	
Interaction (2008)									0.079
									(0.081)
State welfare support (08)									0.389***
									(0.036)
Constant	0.695	1.424	1.137	1.103	1.089	1.342	1.279	0.778	0.860
	(0.103)	(0.110)	(0.090)	(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.105)	(0.128)	(0.100)	(0.134)
r2	0.041	0.152	0.105	0.117	0.138	0.118	0.240	0.184	0.299
df_m	5.000	4.000	5.000	5.000	5.000	5.000	6.000	6.000	6.000
N	1785.000	1044.000	1809.000	1642.000	1460.000	1701.000	699.000	1426.000	866.000

*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

Appendix: Annotated Syntax That Corresponds with the Tables

Table 3: Variables as coded in STATA

Name of variable (year of POLPAN wave in parentheses)	Original variable as listed in the data set	Coding of the variable as used in this paper
Index of State welfare Support (1988)[a] (Statewelfare88)	z128b z128c z128d	Factor Variable of opinions on State Welfare Support ranging from "0" to "5", 0=Definitely disagree; 5= Definitely agree
Index of State welfare Support (1993)[b] (Statewelfare93)	ym05ze ym05zf ym05zg	
Index of State welfare Support (1998)[c] (Statewelfare98)	uc01g uc01e uc02a	
Index of State welfare Support (2003)[d] (Statewelfare03)	xm06e xm06g xm06h	
Index of State welfare Support (2008)[e] (Statewelfare08)	wm06e wm06h wm06g	
Index of State welfare Support (2013)[f] (Statewelfare13)	vm03e vm03h vm03g	
Youth aged 21-25 in 1988 (youth88_21_25)	age1988	Dummy variable consisting of respondents aged 21-25 in the 1988 wave (1=21/25; 0=else)
Youth aged 26-30 in 1988 (youth88_26_30)	age1998	Dummy variable consisting of respondents aged 26-30 in the 1988 wave (1=26/30; 0=else)
Youth aged 26-30 in 1993* (youth93_26_30)	age1993	Dummy variable consisting of respondents aged 26-30 in the 1993 wave (1=26/30; 0=else)
Youth aged 21-25 in the 1998 wave (youth98_21_25)	age1998	Dummy variable consisting of respondents aged 21-25 in the 1998

		wave (1=21/25; 0=else)
Youth aged 26-30 in the 1998 wave (youth98_26_30)	age1998	Dummy variable consisting of respondents aged 26-30 in the 1998 wave (1=26/30; 0=else)
Youth aged 21-25 in the 2003 wave (youth03_21_25)	age2003	Dummy variable consisting of respondents aged 21-25 in the 2003 wave (1=21/25; 0=else)
Youth aged 26-30 in the 2003 wave (youth03_26_30)	age2003	Dummy variable consisting of respondents aged 26-30 in the 2003 wave (1=26/30; 0=else)
Youth aged 21-25 in the 2008 wave (youth08_21_25)	age2008	Dummy variable consisting of respondents aged 21-25 in the 2008 wave (1=21/25; 0=else)
Youth aged 26-30 in the 2008 wave (youth08_26_30)	age2008	Dummy variable consisting of respondents aged 26-30 in the 2008 wave (1=26/30; 0=else)
Youth aged 21-25 in the 2013 wave (youth13_21_25)	age2013	Dummy variable consisting of respondents aged 21-25 in the 2013 wave (1=21/25; 0=else)
Youth aged 26-30 in the 2013 wave (youth13_26_30)	age2013	Dummy variable consisting of respondents aged 26-30 in the 2013 wave (1=26/30; 0=else)
Average Income per person in the 1988 wave (income88_pers)	z103 z94hsize	Metric variable measuring income= z103 (household income)/z94hsize (household size)
Average Income per person in the 1993 wave (income93_pers)	yr13 yr35	Metric variable measuring income= yr13 (household

		income)/ yr35 (household size)
Average Income per person in the 1998 wave (income98_pers)	xr20 xr08	Metric variable measuring income= xr20(household income)/ xr08 (household size)
Average Income per person in the 2003 wave (income03_pers)	wr1621 wr08	Metric variable measuring income= wr1621(household income)/ wr08(household size)
Average Income per person in the 2008 wave (income08_pers)	vr22 vr14	Metric variable measuring income= vr22 (household income)/ vr14 (household size)
Average income per person in the 2013 wave (income13_pers)	uk21 uk16	Metric variable measuring income= uk21 (household income)/ uk16 (household size)
R's education in years in the 1988 wave (eduyrs88)	eduyrs88	Metric Variable measuring a Respondent's education in years ranging from 5-17 in 1988
R's education in years in the 1993 wave (eduyrs93)	eduyrs93	Metric Variable measuring a Respondent's education in years ranging from 5-17 in 1993
R's education in years in the 1998 wave (eduyrs98)	eduyrs98	Metric Variable measuring a Respondent's education in years ranging from 5-17 in 1998
R's education in years in the 2003 wave (eduyrs03)	eduyrs03	Metric Variable measuring a Respondent's education in years ranging from 5-21 in 2003

R's education in years in the 2008 wave (eduyrs08)	eduyrs08	Metric Variable measuring a Respondent's education in years ranging from 4-20 in 2008
R's education in years in the 2013 wave (eduyrs13)	eduyrs13	Metric Variable measuring a Respondent's education in years ranging from 6-20 in 2013
Respondents gender (sex)	sex	Dummy variable coded 1=male, 0=female

Table 4. Factor Analysis of State Welfare

	Distribution		Factor Loading
Name of variable (year of POLPAN wave in parentheses)	Means	Standard Deviation	
1988			1988[a]
Opinion on State aid to children ('88)	4.2	1.0	0.752
Opinion on state Inequality ('88)	3.8	1.2	0.716
Opinions on State provided jobs ('88)	4.5	0.9	0.730
1993			1993[b]
Opinion on State aid to children ('93)	4.3	0.9	0.695
Opinion on state Inequality ('93)	3.6	1.3	0.764
Opinions on State provided jobs ('93)	4.3	1.0	0.795
1998			1998[c]
Opinion on State aid to children ('98)	4.5	0.7	0.653
Opinion on state Inequality ('98)	3.5	1.2	0.715
Opinions on State provided jobs ('98)	4.2	1.1	0.793
2003			2003[d]
Opinion on State aid to children ('03)	4.6	0.6	0.654
Opinion on state Inequality ('03)	3.7	1.2	0.728
Opinions on State provided jobs ('03)	4.3	0.1	0.781
2008			2008[e]

Opinion on State aid to children (‘08)	4.5	0.6	0.669
Opinion on state Inequality (‘08)	3.8	1.1	0.758
Opinions on State provided jobs (‘08)	4.2	0.1	0.792
2013			2013[f]
Opinion on State aid to children (‘13)	4.5	0.7	0.658
Opinion on state Inequality (‘13)	3.7	1.2	0.688
Opinions on State provided jobs (‘13)	4.3	0.1	0.761

A: Eigenvalue= 1.61; Proportion of expected variance= 0.54
B: Eigenvalue= 1.70; Proportion of expected variance= 0.57
C: Eigenvalue= 1.57; Proportion of expected variance= 0.52
D: Eigenvalue= 1.56; Proportion of expected variance= 0.52
E: Eigenvalue= 1.65; Proportion of expected variance= 0.55
F: Eigenvalue= 1.48; Proportion of expected variance= 0.50